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Abstract:  Erev, Ert, and Roth organized three choice prediction competitions focused on 
three related choice tasks: one shot decisions from description (decisions under risk), one 
shot decisions from experience, and repeated decisions from experience. Each 
competition was based on two experimental datasets: An estimation dataset, and a 
competition dataset. The studies that generated the two datasets used the same methods 
and subject pool, and examined decision problems randomly selected from the same 
distribution.  After collecting the experimental data to be used for estimation, the 
organizers posted them on the Web, together with their fit with several baseline models, 
and challenged other researchers to compete to predict the results of the second 
(competition) set of experimental sessions. Fourteen teams responded to the challenge: 
the last seven authors of this paper are members of the winning teams. The results 
highlight the robustness of the difference between decisions from description and 
decisions from experience.  The best predictions of decisions from descriptions were 
obtained with a stochastic variant of prospect theory assuming that the sensitivity to the 
weighted values decreases with the distance between the cumulative payoff functions.  
The best predictions of decisions from experience were obtained with models that assume 
reliance on small samples.  Merits and limitations of the competition method are 
discussed. 
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A major focus of mainstream behavioral decision research has been on finding and 
studying counter-examples to rational decision theory, and specifically examples in 
which expected utility theory can be shown to make a false prediction. This has led to a 
concentration of attention on situations in which utility theory makes a clear, falsifiable 
prediction; hence situations in which all outcomes and their probabilities are precisely 
described, so that there is no room for ambiguity about subjects’ beliefs. Alternative 
theories, such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), have been formulated to 
explain and generalize the deviations from utility theory observed in this way. 
  The focus on counterexamples and their explanations has many attractive 
features.  It has led to important observations, and theoretical insights.  Nevertheless, 
behavioral decision research may benefit from broadening this focus.  The main goal of 
the current research is to facilitate and explore one such direction: The study of 
quantitative predictions.  We share a certain hesitation about proceeding to quantitative 
predictions prematurely, before the groundwork has been laid for a deep understanding 
that could motivate fundamental models. But our interest comes in part from the 
observation that the quest for accurate quantitative predictions can often be an inspiration 
for precise theory. Indeed, it appears that many important scientific discoveries were 
triggered by an initial documentation of quantitative regularities that allow useful 
predictions.
1   
A second motivation for the present study comes from the “1-800 critique” of 
behavioral research.  According to this critique, the description of many popular models, 
and of the conditions under which they are expected to apply, is not clear.  Thus, the 
authors who publish these models should add 1-800 toll free phone numbers and be ready 
to help potential users in deriving the predictions of their models.  The significance of the 
1-800 problem is clarified by a comparison of exams used to evaluate college students in 
                                                 
1 One of the earlier examples is the Pythagorean theorem.  Archeological evidence suggests that the 
underlying regularity (the useful quantitative predictions) were known and used in Babylon 1300 years 
before Pythagoras (Neugebauer & Sachs, 1945).  Pythagoras’ main contribution was the clarification of the 
theoretical explanation of this rule and its implications.  Another important example is provided by 
Kepler’s laws.  As suggested by Klahr and Simon (1999) it seems that these laws were discovered based on 
data mining techniques.  The major theoretical insights were provided by Newton, almost 100 years after 
Kepler’s contributions.  A similar sequence characterizes one of the earliest and most important discoveries 
in Psychology.  Weber’s law was discovered before Fechner provided an elegant theoretical explanation of 
this quantitative regularity.  These successes of research that starts with a focus on quantitative regularities 
suggest that a similar approach can be useful in behavioral decision research too.   3 
the exact and behavioral sciences. Typical questions in the exact sciences ask the 
examinees to predict the outcome of a particular experiment, while typical questions in 
the behavioral sciences ask the examinees to exhibit understanding of a particular 
theoretical construct (see Erev & Livne-Tarandach‘s, 2005 analysis of the GRE exams).  
This gap appears to reflect the belief that the leading models of human behavior do not 
lead to clear predictions. A more careful study of quantitative predictions may help 
change this situation.  
A third motivating observation comes from the discovery of important boundaries 
of the behavioral tendencies that best explain famous counterexamples.  For example, one 
of the most important contributions of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) is 
the demonstration that two of the best-known counterexamples to expected utility theory, 
the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) and the observation that people buy lotteries but also 
insurance (Friedman & Savage, 1948), can be a product of a tendency to overweight rare 
events.   While this tendency is robust, it is not general.  The recent studies of decisions 
from experience demonstrate that in many settings people exhibit the opposite bias: They 
behave as if they underweight rare events (see Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig, Barron, 
Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008; Erev, Glozman, & 
Hertwig, 2008; Rakow, Demes, & Newell, 2008; Ungemach, Chater & Stewart, 2009). A 
focus on quantitative predictions may help identify the boundaries of the different 
tendencies.  
Finally, moving away from a focus on choices that provide counterexamples to 
expected utility theory invites the study of situations in which expected utility theory may 
not provide clear predictions. There are many interesting environments that fall into this 
category, including decisions from experience.  The reason is that, when participants are 
free to form their own beliefs based on their experience, almost any decisions can be 
consistent with utility theory under certain assumptions concerning these beliefs.   
  The present competition (which is of course a collaboration among many 
researchers) is designed in part to address the fact that evaluating quantitative predictions 
offers individual researchers different incentives than those for finding counterexamples 
to expected utility theory.  The best presentations of counterexamples typically start with 
the presentation of a few interesting phenomena, and conclude with the presentation of an   4 
elegant and insightful model to explain them.  The evaluation of quantitative predictions, 
on the other hand, tends to focus on many examples of a choice task. The researcher then 
has to estimate models, and run another large (random sample) study to compare the 
different models.  In addition, readers of papers on quantitative prediction might be 
worried that the probability a particular paper will be written increases if it supports the 
model proposed by the authors. 
   To address this problematic incentive structure, the current research uses a choice 
prediction competition that can reduce the cost per investigator, and can increase the 
probability of insightful outcomes.  The first three authors of the paper (Erev, Ert, & 
Roth, hereafter EER) organized three choice prediction competitions.  They ran the 
necessary costly studies of randomly selected problems, and challenged other researchers 
to predict the results.
2  One competition focused on predicting decisions from description, 
and two competitions focused on predicting decisions from experience.  The participants' 
goal in each of the competitions was to predict the results of a specific experiment.     
  Notice that this design extends the classical study of counterexamples along two 
dimensions.  The first dimension is the parameters of the choice problems (the possible 
outcomes and their probabilities).  The current focus on randomly selected parameters is 
expected to facilitate the evaluation of the robustness of the relevant tendencies.  The 
second dimension is the source of the information available to the decision makers 
(description or experience).  The comparison of the different sources and the different 
models that best fit behavior in the different conditions was expected to shed light on the 
gap between decisions from description and decisions from experience.  It could be that 
the differences in observed behavior are more like differences in degree than differences 
in kind, and that both kinds of behavior might be predicted best by similar models, with 
different parameters. Or, it could be that decisions from description will be predicted best 
by very different sorts of models than those that predict decisions from experience well, 
                                                 
2 A similar approach was taken by Arifovic, McKelvey, and Pevnitskaya (2006) and Lebiere & Bothell 
(2004) who organized Turing tournaments.  Arifovic et al. challenged participants to submit models that 
emulate human behavior (in 2-person games) and sniffers (models that try to distinguish between human 
and emulators).  The models were ranked based on an interaction between the two types of submissions.  
As explained below, the current competitions are simpler: The sniffers are replaced with a pre-determined 
criterion to rank models. Note that to the extent that competitions ameliorate counterincentives to 
conducting certain kinds of research, they can be viewed as a solution to a market design problem (Roth, 
2008).   5 
in which case the differences between the models may suggest ways in which the 
differences in behavior may be further explored. 
 
1. Methods 
The current research involved three related but independent choice prediction 
competitions.  All three competitions focused on the prediction of binary choices between 
a safe prospect that provides a Medium payoff (referred to as M) with certainty, and a 
risky prospect that yields a High payoff (H) with probability Ph, and a Low payoff (L) 
otherwise.  Thus, the basic choice problem is: 
Safe: M with certainty 
Risky: H with probability Ph; L otherwise (with probability 1-Ph) 
 
Table 1a presents 60 problems of this type that will be considered below.  Each of the 
three competitions focused on a distinct experimental condition, with the object being to 
predict the behavior of the experimental subjects in that condition.    In Condition 
“Description,” the participants in the experiment were asked to make a single choice 
based on a description of the prospects (as in the decisions under risk paradigm 
considered by Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  In Condition “Experience-Sampling” (E-
Sampling) subjects made one-shot decisions from experience (as in Hertwig et al., 2004), 
and in Condition “Experience-Repeated” (E-Repeated) subjects made repeated decisions 
from experience (as in Barron & Erev, 2003). 
<Insert Table 1> 
 
The three competitions were each based on the data from two experimental 
sessions, an estimation session, and a competition session.  The two sessions for each 
condition used the same method and examine similar, but not identical, decision 
problems and decision makers as described below.  The estimation sessions were run in 
March 2008. After the completion of these experimental sessions EER posted the data 
(described in Table 1a) on the Web (see EER, 2008) and challenged researchers to 
participate in three competitions that focused on the prediction of the data of the second   6 
(competition) sessions.
3  The call to participate in the competition was published in the 
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making and in the e-mail lists of the leading scientific 
organizations that focus on decision-making and behavioral economics.  The competition 
was open to all; there were no prior requirements. The predictions submission deadline 
was September 1
st 2008. The competition sessions were run in May 2008, but we did not 
look at the results until September 2
nd 2008.    
Researchers participating in the competitions were allowed to study the results of 
the estimation study.  Their goal was to develop a model that would predict the results of 
the competition study.  The model had to be implemented in a computer program that 
reads the payoff distributions of the relevant gambles as an input and predicts the 
proportion of risky choices as an output. Thus, the competitions used the generalization 
criterion methodology (see Busemeyer & Wang, 2000).
4 
 
1.1 The problem selection algorithm. 
Each study focused on 60 problems.  The exact problems were determined with a 
random selection of the parameters (prizes and probabilities) L, M, H and Ph using the 
algorithm described in Appendix 1.  Notice that the algorithm generates a random 
distribution of problems such that about 1/3 of the problems involve rare (low 
probability) High outcomes (Ph < .1), and about 1/3 involve rare Low outcomes (Ph > 
.9).   In addition 1/3 of the problems are in the gain domain (all outcomes are positive), 
1/3 are in the loss domain (all outcomes are negative), and the rest are mixed problems 
(at least one positive and one negative outcome). The medium prize M is chosen from a 
distribution with a mean equal to the expected value of the risky lottery. 
Table 1a presents the 60 problems that were selected for the estimation study.  
The same algorithm was used to select the 60 problems in the competition study.  Thus, 
the two studies focused on choice problems that were randomly sampled from the same 
space of problems.   
 
                                                 
3 The main prize for the winners was an invitation to co-author the current manuscript; the last seven co-
authors are the members of the three winning teams. 
4 This constraint implies that the submissions could not use any information concerning the observed 
behavior in the competition set. Specifically, each model was submitted with fixed parameters that were 
used to predict the data of the competition set.   7 
1.2 The estimation study 
  One hundred and sixty Technion students participated in the estimation study. 
Participants were paid 40 Sheqels ($11.40) for showing up, and could earn more money 
or lose part of the show-up fee during the experiment.  Each participant was randomly 
assigned to one of the three experimental conditions. 
Each participant was seated in front of a personal computer and was presented 
with a sequence of choice tasks.  The exact tasks depended on the experimental condition 
as explained below.  The procedure lasted about 40 minutes on average in all three 
conditions. 
The payoffs on the experimental screen in all conditions referred to Israeli 
Sheqels. At the end of the experiment one choice was randomly selected and the 
participant’s payoff for this choice determined his/her final payoff. 
The 60 choice problems listed in Table 1a (the estimation set) were studied under 
all three conditions.  The main difference between the three conditions was the 
information source (description, sampling or feedback).  But the manipulation of this 
factor necessitated other differences as well (because the choice from experience 
conditions are more time consuming).  The specific experimental methods in each of the 
three conditions are described below:  
  
Condition Description (One-shot decisions under risk):  
Twenty Technion students were assigned to this condition.  Each participant was 
seated in front of a personal computer screen and was then presented with the prizes and 
probabilities for each of the 60 problems. Participants were asked to choose once between 
the sure payoff and the risky gamble in each of the 60 problems that were randomly 
ordered.  A typical screen and the instructions are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
Condition Experience-Sampling (E-sampling, one shot decisions from experience) 
            Forty Technion students participated in this condition. They were randomly 
assigned to two different sub-groups. Each sub-group contained 20 participants who were 
presented with a representative sample of 30 problems from the estimation set (each 
problem appeared in only one of the samples, and each sample included 10 problems   8 
from each payoff domain). The participants were told that the experiment includes 
several games, and in each game they were asked to choose once between two decks of 
cards (represented by two buttons on the screen). It was explained that before making this 
choice they will be able to sample the two decks. Each game was started with the 
sampling stage, and the participants were asked to press the "choice stage" key when they 
felt they had sampled enough (but not before sampling at least once from each deck).   
The outcomes of the sampling were determined by the relevant problem.  One 
deck corresponded to the safe alternative: All the (virtual) cards in this deck provided the 
medium payoff.  The second deck corresponded to the payoff distribution of the risky 
option; e.g., sampling the risky deck in problem 21 resulted with the payoff “+2 Sheqels” 
in 10% of the cases, and outcome “-5.7 Sheqels” in the other cases. 
At the choice stage participants were asked to select once between the two virtual 
decks of cards.  Their choice yielded a (covert) random draw of one card from the 
selected deck and was considered at the end of the experiment to determine the final 
payoff.  A typical screen and the instructions are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
Condition Experience-repeated (E-repeated, repeated decisions from experience): 
One-hundred Technion students participated in this condition. They were 
randomly assigned to five different sub-groups. Each sub-group contained 20 participants 
who were presented with 12 problems (each problem appeared in only one of the 
samples, and each sample included an equal proportion of problems from each payoff 
domain). Each participant was seated in front of a personal computer and was presented 
with each of the problems for a block of 100 trials.  Participants were told that the 
experiment would include several independent sections (each section included a repeated 
play of one of the 12 problems), in each of which they would be asked to select between 
two unmarked buttons that appeared on the screen (one button was associated with the 
safe alternative and the other button corresponded to the risky gamble of the relevant 
problem) in each of an unspecified number of trials. Each selection was followed by a 
presentation of its outcome in Sheqels (a draw from the distribution associated with that 
button, e.g., selecting the risky button in problem 21 resulted in a gain of 2 Sheqels with 
probability 0.1 and a loss of 5.7 Sheqels otherwise).  Thus, the feedback was limited to   9 
the obtained payoff; the forgone payoff (the payoff from the unselected button) was not 
presented.  A typical screen and the instructions are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
1.3 The competition study 
  The competition session in each condition was identical to the estimation session 
with two exceptions: Different problems were randomly selected, and different subjects 
participated.  Table 1b presents the 60 problems which were selected by the same 
algorithm used to draw the problems in the estimation sessions.  The 160 participants 
were drawn from the same population used in Study 1 (Technion students) without 
replacement.  That is, the participants in the competition study did not participate in the 
estimation study, and the choice problems were new problems randomly drawn from the 
same distribution. 
 
1.4 The competition criterion: Mean Squared Distance (MSD), interpreted as the 
Equivalent Number of Observations (ENO). 
The competitions used a Mean Squared Distance (MSD) criterion.  Specifically, 
the winner in each competition is the model that minimizes the average squared distance 
between the prediction and the observed choice proportion in the relevant condition (the 
mean over the 20 participants in Conditions Description and E-sampling, and over the 20 
participants and 100 trials in Condition E-repeated).  This measure has several attractive 
features.  Two of these features are well known: The MSD score underlies traditional 
statistical methods (like regression and the t-test) and is a proper scoring rule (see Brier, 
1950; Selten, 1998; and a discussion of the conditions under which the properness is 
likely to be important in Yates, 1990).  Two additional attractive features emerge from 
the computation of the ENO (Equivalent Number of Observations), an order-preserving 
transformation of the MSD scores (Erev, Roth, Slonim, & Barron, 2007).  The ENO of a 
model is an estimation of the size of the experiment that has to be run to obtain 
predictions that are more accurate than the model’s prediction.  For example, if a model 
has an ENO of 10, its prediction of the probability of the R choice in a particular problem 
is expected to be as accurate as the prediction based on the observed proportion of R 
choices in an experimental study of that problem with 10 participants.  Erev et al. show   10 
that this score can be estimated as ENO = S
2/(MSE - S
2) where S
2 is the pooled estimated 
variance over problems, and MSE is the mean squared distance between the prediction 
and the choices of the individual subjects (0 or 1 in the current case).
5  When the sample 
size is n = 20, MSE = MSD + S
2(20/19). 
One advantage of the ENO statistics is its intuitive interpretation as the size of an 
experiment rather than an abstract score.   Another advantage is the observation that the 
ENO of the model can be used to facilitate optimal combination of the models' prediction 
with new data; in this case the ENO is interpreted as the weight of the model’s prediction 
in a regression that also includes the mean results of an experiment (see a related 
observation in Carnap, 1953).   
 
2. The results of the estimation study 
  The right hand columns in Table 1a present the aggregate results of the estimation 
study.  They show the mean choice proportions of the risky prospect (the R-rate) and the 
mean number of samples that participants took in condition E-sampling over the two 
prospects (60% of the samples were from the risky prospect).   
 
2.1 Correlation analysis and the weighting of rare events 
The left hand side of Table 2 presents the correlations between the risky choices 
(R-rates) in the three conditions using problem as a unit of analysis.  The results over the 
58 problems without dominant
6 alternatives reveal a high correlation between the two 
experience conditions (r[E-Sampling, E-Repeated] = 0.83, p < .0001), and a large 
difference between these conditions and the description condition (r[Description, E-
Sampling) = -0.53,  p = .0004; and r[Description, E-Repeated] = -0.37, p = .004).  The 
lower panel in Table 2 distinguishes between problems with and without rare events.  
These analyses demonstrate that only with rare events does the difference between 
experience and description emerge.   
                                                 
5 A reliable estimation of ENO requires a prior estimation of the parameter of the models, and a random 
draw of the experimental tasks.  Thus, the translation of MSD scores to ENO is meaningful in an 
experiment such as this one in which parameters are estimated from a random sample of problems, and 
predictions are over another random sample from the same distribution of problems. 
6 There were two problems that included a dominant alternative in the estimation set (problems 1 and 43) 
and 4 such problems in the competition set (problems 15, 22, 31, 36).    11 
Additional clarification of this difference between the three conditions is provided 
in Figure 1a, which presents the R-rate as a function of Ph by condition.   The results 
reveal an increase in the R-rates with Ph in the two experience conditions, and a decrease 
in the description condition.  Since for each value of Ph the riskless payoff M is on 
average equal to the expected value of the risky lottery, this pattern is consistent with the 
assertion that people exhibit overweighting of rare events in decisions from description, 
and underweighting of rare events in decisions from experience (see Barron & Erev, 
2003).  
<Insert Table 2, Insert Figure 1> 
 
3. Baseline models   
The results of the estimation study were posted on the competition Website on 
April 1
st 2008 (a month before the beginning of the competition study).  At the same time 
EER posted several baseline models.  Each model was implemented as a computer 
program that satisfies the requirements for submission to the competition.  The baseline 
models were selected to achieve two main goals.  The first goal was technical: The 
programs of the baseline models were part of the "instructions to participants." They 
served as examples of feasible submissions.  
The second goal was to illustrate the range of MSD scores that can be obtained.  
One of the baseline models for each condition was the best model that EER could find (in 
terms of fitting the results of the estimation study).  The presentation of these "strong 
baselines" was designed to reduce the number of submissions that were not likely to win 
the competition. 
The following sections describe some of the baseline models.  We present the 
strongest baseline for each competition (the one that minimized the MSD on the 
estimation set).  To clarify the relationships of strongest baselines to previous research, 
we start each subsection with the presentation of one predecessor of the strongest 
baseline. 
 
3.1 Baseline Models for Condition Description (One-shot decisions under risk) 
   12 
3.1.1 Original (5-parameter) Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) 
According to cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), decision-
makers are assumed to select the prospect with the highest weighted value.  The weighted 
value of Prospect X that pays x1 with probability p1, and x2 otherwise (probability p2=1-
p1) is: 
 
(1)                             
 
where V(xi) is the subjective value of outcome xi, and π (pi) is the subjective weight of 
outcome xi.  The subjective values are given by a value function that can be described as 
follows: 
            (2)                              
The parameters 0 < α < 1 and 0 < β < 1 reflect diminishing sensitivity to increases in the 
absolute payoffs in the gain and the loss domain respectively. According to the 
diminishing sensitivity assumption the subjective impact of a change in the absolute 
payoff decreases with the distance from zero (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, and 
motivating observations in Stevens, 1957). The parameter λ >1 captures the loss aversion 
assertion suggesting that losses loom larger than equivalent gains.  
           The subjective weights are assumed to depend on the outcomes' rank and sign, and 
on a cumulative weighting function.  When the two outcomes are of different signs, the 
weight of outcome i is:  
(3)   
The parameters 0 < γ < 1 and 0 < δ < 1 capture the tendency to overweight low-
probability extreme outcomes.   
When the outcomes are of the same sign, the weight of the most extreme outcome 
(largest absolute value) is computed with equation (3) (as if it is the sole outcome of that   13 
sign), and the weight of the less extreme outcome is the difference between that value and 
1.  
The competition Website (EER, 2008) presents the predictions of CPT with the 
parameters that best fit the current data.  The top left-hand side of Table 3a presents the 
estimated parameters and three measures of the accuracy (fit) of the model with these 
parameters.  The first two measures are the proportion of agreement between modal 
choice and the prediction (Pagree = 1 if the observed and predicted R-rates fall in the 
same side of 0.5; it equals 0.5 if one of the two equals 0.5; and 0 otherwise) and the 
correlation between the observed and the predicted results across the 60 problems.  These 
measures show high agreement (95%) and high correlation (0.85).   The third measure, 
and the focus of the current competition, is a Mean Square Distance (MSD) score.  It 
reflects the mean of the squared distance of the prediction from the mean results (over 
participants) in each problem. Thus it is the mean of 60 squared distance scores.   
< Insert Table 3 > 
 
3.1.2 Stochastic cumulative prospect theory (SCPT).   
The second model considered here was found to be the best baseline model in 
Condition Description.  It provided the best fit for the estimation data.  This model is a 
stochastic variant of cumulative prospect theory proposed by Erev, Roth, Slonim and 
Barron (2002; and see a similar idea in Busemeyer, 1985).  The model assumes that the 
probability of selecting the risky prospect (R) over the safe prospect (S) increases with 
the relative advantage of that prospect. Specifically, this probability is: 
  
(4)             
The parameter µ captures the sensitivity to the differences between the two prospects, and 
D is the absolute distance between the two value distributions (under CPT).  In the 
current context D = |H-M|[π(Ph)]+|M-L|[π(1-Ph)]. 
           Table 3a presents the scores of SCPT with the parameters that best fit the 
estimation data set (α=.89, β=.98, λ=1.5,µ=2.15 γ=δ=.7).  Comparison with the CPT row 
shows that the stochastic response rule (added in SCPT) dramatically reduces the MSD   14 
score (from .093 to .012).  To clarify the intuition behind this advantage, consider two 
problems in which the observed R-rates are 0.75 and 1.0.  Deterministic models like CPT 
cannot distinguish between the two problems.  Their MSD score is minimized by 
predicting R-rates of 1.0 in both problems.  Thus the minimal MSD score is [(1- .75)
2 –(1 
- 1)
 2]/2 = 0.03125.  Stochastic models like SCPT can distinguish between these problems 
and their minimal MSD score is 0.  Notice that when parameter µ is large, SCPT 
approximates the predictions of CPT.  The advantage of SCPT highlights the importance 
of this parameter. 
 
3.1.3 Other baseline models for Condition Description 
The other baseline models considered by EER for Condition Description include 
restricted variants of SCPT, and the priority heuristic (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & 
Hertwig, 2006).  The analysis of the restricted variants of SCPT highlights the robustness 
of this model: It provides useful predictions even when it is used with the parameters 
estimated in previous research.   The analysis of the priority rule shows that its fit of the 
current data is comparable to the fit of the original variant of CPT.   
 
3.2 Baseline models for Condition E-sampling (one-shot decisions from experience)  
3.2.1 Primed sampler 
            The primed sampler model (Erev, Glozman & Hertwig, 2008) implies a simple 
choice rule in condition sampling: The participants are expected to take a sample of k  
draws from each alternative, and select the alternative with the higher sample mean.  
Table 3b shows that this simple model provides a good approximation of the current 
results.  The value k = 5 minimizes the MSD score.  
  
3.2.2 Primed sampler with variability. 
            Under a natural extension of the primed sampler model the exact value of the 
sample size differs between participants and decisions.  The current model captures this 
idea with the assumption that the exact sample size (from each alternative) is uniformly 
drawn from the integers between 1 and k.  Best fit is obtained with k =9.  Table 3b shows 
that the added variability improves the fit.   15 
 
3.3 Baseline models for Condition E-Repeated (repeated decisions from experience) 
3.3.1 Explorative sampler  
The predictions of the explorative sampler model (Erev, Ert & Yechiam, 2008) 
for the current task can be summarized with the following assumptions:  
A1: Exploration and exploitation. The agents are assumed to consider two 
cognitive strategies: exploration and exploitation. Exploration implies a random choice.  
The probability of exploration is 1 in the very first trial, and it reduces toward an 
asymptote (at ε) with experience.  The effect of experience on the probability of 
exploration depends on the expected number of trials in the experiment (T).  Exploration 
diminishes quickly when T is small, and slowly when T is large (in the current study T = 
100).  This assumption is quantified as follows: 
    (5)                                       
                                                                      
where δ is a free parameter that captures the sensitivity to the length of the experiment. 
A2: Experiences. The experiences with each alternative include the set of 
observed outcomes yielded by this alternative in previous trials.  In addition, the very first 
outcome is recalled as an experience with both alternatives.   
A3: Naïve sampling from memory. Under exploitation the agent draws (from 
memory, with replacement) a sample of mt past experiences with each alternative.  All 
previous experiences are equally likely to be sampled. The value of mt at trial t is 
assumed to be randomly selected from the set {1, 2,., k} where k  is a free parameter.   
A4: Regressiveness, diminishing sensitivity, and choice. The recalled subjective 
value of the outcome x (from selecting alternative j) at trial t are assumed to be affected 
by two factors: regression to the mean of all the experiences with the relevant alternative 
(in the first t-1 trials), and diminishing sensitivity.   Regression is captured with the 
assumption that the regressed value is Rx= (1-w)x + (w)Aj(t), where w is a free parameter 
and Aj(t) is the average outcome from the relevant alternative.
7 
                                                 
7 Implicit in this regressiveness (the assumption W > 0) is the assumption that all the experiences are 
weighted (because all the experiences affect the mean).  The value of this implicit assumption was 
demonstrated by Lebiere, Gonzalez and Martin (2007).   16 
            Diminishing sensitivity is captured with a variant of prospect theory’s (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979) value function that assumes 
(6)                         
 
where αt = (1+Vt)
(-β), β > 0, is a free parameter, and Vt is a measure of payoff variability. 
Vt is computed as the average absolute difference between consecutive obtained payoffs 
in the first t-1 trials (with an initial value at 0).  The parameter β captures the effect of 
diminishing sensitivity: large β implies a quick increase in diminishing sensitivity with 
payoff variability. 
The estimated subjective value of each alternative at trial t is the mean of the 
subjective value of the alternative's sample in that trial.  Under exploitation the agent 
selects the alternative with the highest estimated value. 
 
3.3.2 Explorative sampler with recency  
Evaluation of the fitting scores of the explorative sampler model reveals that this 
model over-predicts the tendency to select the risky prospect.  The best baseline model 
for Condition E-Repeated is a refinement of the explorative sampler model that was 
developed to address this bias.  Specifically, the refined model assumes that the most 
recent outcome with each alternative is always considered.  This assumption triggers a 
hot stove effect (see Denrell & March, 2001): When the recent payoffs are considered, 
the effect of low outcomes last longer than the effect of high outcomes (because low 
outcomes reduce the probability of additional exploration and they remain the most 
recent outcome more trials).  As a result, the refined model predicts lower R-rates.  The 
change is implemented by replacing assumption A3 with the following assumption: 
A3’: Naïve sampling from memory with recency. Under exploitation the agent 
draws (from memory, with replacement) a sample of mt past experiences with each 
alternative.  The first draw is the most recent experience with each alternative. All 
previous experiences are equally likely to be sampled in the remaining mt-1 draws.     17 
Table 3c presents the scores of the refined model with the parameters that best fit 
the estimation data set (β=.10, w=.3, ε=.12, k=8). Additional analysis reveals that the 
added recency effect does not impair the predictions of the explorative sampler model in 
the experimental conditions reviewed by Erev and Haruvy (2009). 
 
3.3.3  Other baseline models for Condition E-repeated 
The other baseline models considered by EER for Condition E-Repeated include 
different variants of reinforcement-learning models.  This analysis shows the advantage 
of the normalized reinforcement-learning model (see Erev & Barron, 2005; and a similar 
model in Erev, Bereby-Meyer & Roth, 1999), over basic reinforcement-learning models.  
In addition, it shows that it is not easy to find a reinforcement-learning model that 
outperforms the explorative sampler model with recency.  
 
4. The competition sessions. 
Table 1b presents the aggregate experimental data of the competition sessions.  
They show the mean choice proportions of the risky prospect (the R-rate) and the mean 
samples that participants took in condition E-sampling.   
 
4.1 Correlation analysis and the weighting of rare events 
The right-hand columns in Table 2 present the correlations between the R-rates in 
the different conditions in the competition study, and Figure 1b presents the R-rates by 
Ph.  The results replicate the pattern documented in the estimation study.  The two 
experience conditions were similar, and different from the description condition.  The 
difference suggests that the R-rates increase with Ph in the two experience conditions, 
and decrease with Ph in the description condition.  
 
5. Competition results 
Twenty-three models were submitted to participate in the different competitions; 
eight to the description condition, seven to the E-sampling condition and eight to the E-
repeated condition.  The submitted models involved a large span of methods ranging 
from logistic regression, ACT-R based cognitive modeling, neural networks, production   18 
rules, and basic mathematical models.  In accordance with the competition rules, the 
ranking of the models was determined based on the mean squared distance (MSD) 
between the predicted and observed choice proportion in the competition data set.   
 
5.1 Condition Description: 
The lower panels in Table 3a present the three best submitted models for 
Condition Description.  Two of these abstractions are variants of cumulative prospect 
theory (and some added assumptions) with a stochastic choice rule. The winner of this 
competition is a logit-regression model submitted by Ernan Haruvy, described in detail in 
the following section.   
 
5.1.1 The winning model in Condition Description: Linear utility and logistic choice 
The current model was motivated by the observation that leading models of 
decisions from description, like prospect theory, imply weighting of several variables 
(functions of the probabilities and the outcomes).  That is, they can be described as 
regression models.  Under this assertion, one can use regression techniques in order to 
facilitate the predictive accuracy of models of this type.  Thus, Haruvy submitted the best 
regression-based model that he could find to the competition. 
The model can be captured by two equations.  The first defines T(R) -- the 
tendency to prefer the risky prospect: 
 
(7)     T(R) = β0 + β1*H + β2*L + β3*M + γ1*Ph + γ2*EV(R) + γ3*(Dummy1) 
 
The values H, L, M and Ph are the parameters of the choice problem as defined above.  
EV(R) is the expected payoff of the risky prospect, and Dummy1 is a dummy variable 
that assumes the value 1 if the risky choice has higher expected value than the safe choice 
and 0 otherwise. 
The second equation assumes a logistic choice rule that defines the predicted 
proportion of risky choices, P(R), based on the relevant tendency: 
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(8)   P(R) =   
   
The estimated parameters are: β0 = 1.004, β1 = 0.012, β2 = 0.066, β3 = -0.410, γ1 
1.417, γ2 = 0.317, γ3 = -0.621.  
Table 3a shows that the current model provides a better fit (lower MSD score) for 
the estimation data than the best baseline model.  The model has slightly higher MSD 
score in the competition set (0.0126 vs. 0.0099 in the estimation set).  The implied ENO 
is 56.4.  This value implies that the model's accuracy (in predicting the population mean) 
is similar to the expected accuracy of the observed R-rate in an experiment with 56 
participants.  
 
5.1.2 Comparison to other models 
Comparison of the winner to the best baseline (SCPT) reveals that SCPT provides 
more useful predictions.  Its ENO was 80.99. Analysis of the differences between the two 
models suggests that the linear utility and logistic choice predictions tend to be more 
conservative than SCPT. That is, the former’s predictions are somewhat biased towards 
50%. This observation suggests that the normalized stochastic response rule assumed by 
SCPT may be a better approximation to behavioral data than the logistic response rule 
used in the regression model.  
  Evaluation of the deterministic models shows that CPT outperformed the priority 
heuristic, but has relatively low ENO (2.32).  As noted above, the low ENO is a reflection 
of the fact that deterministic models, like CPT, cannot discriminate between problems in 
which almost all the participants select the modal choice, and problems in which only 
small majority select the modal choice. 
 
5.1.3 Intuition   
  Another interesting analysis of the models’ predictions involves the comparison 
between their accuracy and the accuracy of intuitive predictions. To evaluate this 
relationship we asked 32 Harvard students to predict the proportion of R choices in each 
of the problems of the competition set.  The 32 "predictors" played each of the problems   20 
themselves for real money (just like the participants of the competition set) before 
making their predictions.  To motivate the predictors to be accurate, they were also 
compensated based on the accuracy of their prediction via a proper scoring rule; this 
compensation decreased linearly with their MSD score in a randomly selected problem. 
Table 3a shows that the students' intuition was not very useful for predicting the 
competition data.  The intuitive predictions of the typical predictors were outperformed 
by the predictions of most models (the intuition MSD was 0.01149, and the median ENO 
was only 1.88).  Additional analysis reveals that in 97% of the problems the mean 
estimations were conservative (closer to 50% than the actual results). For example, in 
Problem 15 (-3.3, 0.97; -10.5) or (-3.2), the observed R-rate was 0.1, and the mean 
intuitive prediction was 0.34.  This conservatism of the mean judgments can be a product 
of a stochastic judgment process (see Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994).  
 
5.2 Condition E-Sampling:  
Table 3.b presents the three best submitted models for condition E-Sampling. The 
winner in this competition is the ensemble model submitted by Stefan Herzog, Robin 
Hau, and Ralph Hertwig. This model assumes four equally likely choice rules. 
 
5.2.1. The winning model in Condition E-Sampling: Ensemble  
The ensemble model is motivated by three observations. First, different people 
appear to use different mental tools when making decisions from experience and simple, 
robust models predict these decisions well (Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008). 
Second, several variants of the models considered above perform well above chance in 
predicting the estimation data, and equally important, the correlations between the 
models’ errors are relatively low. Third, research on forecast combination has 
demonstrated that averaging predictions from different models is a powerful tool for 
boosting accuracy (e.g., Armstrong, 2001; Hibon & Evgeniou, 2005; Timmermann, 
2006). To the extent that individual models predict decisions well above chance, and 
errors are uncorrelated between models
8, the average across models may even outperform 
                                                 
8 How strongly the errors of two models are correlated can be summarized by their bracketing rate (Larrick 
& Soll, 2006), which is the proportion of predictions where the two models err on different sides of the   21 
the best individual model.  
The ensemble model assumes that each choice is made based on one of four 
equally likely rules; thus, the predicted choice rate is the average across the predictions of 
the four models (rules), using equal weights
9.   The first two rules in the ensemble are 
variants of the natural-mean heuristic (see Hertwig & Pleskac, 2008).  The first rule is 
similar to the primed sampler model with variability described in Section 3.2.2.  The 
decision makers are assumed to sample each option m times, and select the option with 
the highest sample mean.  The value of m is uniformly drawn from the set {1,2….9}. 
Predictions below 5% or above 95% were curbed to these valued, as more extreme 
proportions were not observed in the estimation set.  The second rule is identical to the 
first, but m is drawn from the distribution of sample sizes observed in the estimation set, 
with samples larger than 20 treated as 20 (mean = 6.2; median = 5).  
The third rule in the ensemble is a stochastic variant of cumulative prospect 
theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Its functions are identical to the functions assumed 
by the SCPT model presented in Section 3.1.2 with the exception that D is set to equal 1. 
However, the current implementation rests on quite different parameter values (and 
implied processes), namely, values fitted to the estimation set: α = 1.19, β = 1.35, γ = 
1.42, δ = 1.54, λ = 1.19, µ = 0.41. These values imply underweighting of rare events and a 
reversed S-shape value function (a mirror image of the functions that Tversky & 
Kahneman estimated for decisions from descriptions). 
 The final rule is a stochastic version of the lexicographic priority heuristic 
(Brandstätter et al., 2006). The stochastic version was adapted from the priority model 
proposed by Rieskamp (2008). Up to three comparisons are made in one of two orders of 
search. The first order begins by comparing minimum outcomes (i.e., minimum gain or 
minimum losses depending on the domain of gambles), then their associated 
probabilities, and finally the maximum outcomes. The second order begins with 
probabilities of the minimum outcomes, then proceeds to check minimum outcomes, and 
                                                                                                                                                
truth (i.e., one model over- and the other underestimates the true value). In the long run, the average 
prediction of several models will necessarily be at least as accurate as the prediction of a randomly selected 
model. The former will outperform the latter when the bracketing rate is larger than zero, and therefore, 
some errors will cancel each other out. 
9 Equal weighting is robust and can outperform more elaborate weighting schemes (Clemen, 1989; Einhorn 
& Hogarth, 1975; Timmermann, 2006).    22 
ends with the maximum outcomes (the probabilities with which both search orders are 
implemented were determined from the estimation set: porder 1 = 0.38; porder 2 = 0.62). The 
difference between the values being compared is transformed into a subjective difference, 
normally distributed around an objective difference.
10  The variance of the distribution is 
a free parameter estimated to equal σ = .037.  If the subjective difference involving the 
first comparison in each search order exceeds a threshold t, the more attractive option is 
selected based on this comparison; otherwise the next comparison is executed. The values 
of the thresholds are free parameters.  The estimated values are To= 0.0001 for the 
minimum- and maximum-based comparisons, and Tp=0.11 for the probability-based 
comparison.  
The priority rule as implemented here differs in several respects from the original 
priority heuristic, which was originally proposed to model decisions from description 
(Brandstätter et al., 2006).  Most importantly, the heuristic assumed only one search 
order, namely, the first order described above. The fitted parameters suggest that in the 
current decisions from experience, most subjects (62%) follow the second order 
described above. This difference is important because the correlation between the 
predicted behaviors assuming the two orders is negative (-0.66). 
 
5.2.2 Comparison to other models 
Comparison of the winner to the best baseline (primed sampler with variability) 
reveals that the ensemble model provides more useful predictions.  Although both models 
have larger MSD in the competition data, the ensemble model gets to an ENO of 25.92, 
higher than the primed sampler (15.23).   
The advantage of the ensemble model highlights the value of the assumption that 
several decision rules are used.  The success of this assumption can be a product of a 
within-subject variability (the use of different rules at different points in time), a 
                                                 
10 The exact means of these subjective distributions depend of the sign of the payoff H and on the maximal 
absolute payoff (MaxAbs= Max[Abs(L),Abs(M),Abs(H)]).  In the minimum-based comparison the mean is 
(Min-M)/MaxAbs where Min =L if H>0, and H otherwise.   In the probability-based comparison the mean 
is Ph when H > 0, and Ph-1 otherwise.   In the maximum-based comparison the mean is (Maxi-M)/MaxAbs 
where Maxi =H if H>0, and L otherwise.    
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between-subject variability (different people use different rules), and/or between-problem 
variability (the different problems trigger the usage of different rules).   
 
5.3 Condition E -Repeated  
The lower panel in Table 3.c presents the three best submitted models for 
Condition E-Repeated.  All models succeed in capturing the main behavioral trends 
observed in the data: the underweighting of rare events, and the hot stove effect. The 
models differed in their ways of capturing these trends. Two of the models were based on 
contingent sampling, and the third focused on normalized reinforcement learning that 
assumed inertia. The winner of this competition is the model submitted by Terrence 
Stewart, Robert West, and Christian Lebiere.   This model uses the ACT-R architecture 
and assumes similarity-based inference.   
 
5.3.1   The winning model in Condition E-Repeated: ACT-R, blending, and sequential 
dependencies 
The current model rests on the assumption that the effect of experience in 
Condition E-Repeated is similar to the effect of experience in other settings.  Thus, it can 
be captured by the general abstraction of the declarative memory system provided by the 
ACT-R model (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998).  The model can be summarized as follows: 
Declarative memory with sequential dependencies. Each experience is coded into a 
chunk that includes the context, choice, and obtained outcome.  The context is abstracted 
here by the two previous consecutive choices (see related ideas by Lebiere & West, 1999; 
West et al., 2005).  At each trial, the decision maker considers all her experiences under 
the relevant context, and recalls all the experiences with activation levels that exceeded 
the activation cutoff (captured by the parameter τ). 
The activation level of experience i is calculated using Equation 1, where tk is the amount 
of time (number of trials) since the k
th appearance of this item, d is the decay rate, and 
ε(s) is a random value chosen from a logistic distribution with variance π
2s
2/3.  
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(9) 
 
 
 
The learning term of the equation captures the power law of practice and forgetting 
(Anderson & Schooler, 1991), while the random term implements a stochastic “softmax” 
(a.k.a. Boltzmann) retrieval process where the probability Pi of retrieving i is given by: 
 
 
 
where   and the summation is over all experiences over the retrieval threshold. 
 
Choice rule - blending memories.  When the model attempts to recall an experience that 
matches the current context, multiple experiences (chunks) may be found. For example, 
when recalling previous risky choices there are two chunks in memory – one for cases 
that resulted in the high reward and another for cases associated with the low reward. In 
such cases the chunks are blended such that the mean recall value of each alternative at 
trial t is the weighted (by Pi) mean over all the recalled experiences.  The alternative with 
the larger mean is selected (see related ideas in Gonzalez et al., 2003).  
 
Parameters.  The value for parameter d in Equation 1 was set to 0.5, as this is the value 
used in almost all ACT-R models.  The other two parameters were estimated based on the 
estimation set, using the relativized equivalence methodology (Stewart & West, 2007).  
The estimated values are s = 0.35 and τ = -1.6.  It should be noted that these values are 
very close to the default settings for ACT-R, and there are only minor differences in 
predictions between this model and a purely default standard ACT-R model with no 
parameter fitting at all. 
 
5.3.2. Comparison to other models   25 
Implicit in the ACT-R model is the assumption of high sensitivity to a small set of 
previous experiences in situations that are perceived to be similar to the current choice 
task.  The best baseline model (explorative sampler with recency) can be described as a 
different abstraction of the same idea.  The baseline model provided slightly better 
predictions. Its ENO was 47.22 (compared to the ACT-R ENO of 32.5).  
 
5.4 The relationships among the three competitions 
Comparisons of the models submitted to the three competitions show large 
differences among the description and the two experience competitions.  Whereas all the 
models in the description competitions assumed that outcomes are weighted by 
probabilities, the concept "probability" did not play an important role in the models 
submitted to the experience-repeated competition.  Another indication of the large 
differences between the competitions comes from an attempt to use the best models in 
one competition to predict the results in a second competition.  This analysis reveals that 
all the models developed to capture behavior in the description condition have ENO 
below 3 in the two experience conditions.  For example, the best model in Condition 
Description (SCPT with ENO of 80.99) has ENO of 2.34 and 2.19 in Condition E-
Sampling and E-Repeated, respectively.  These values are lower than the ENO of a model 
that predicts random choice (the ENO of the random choice model that predicts an R-rate 
of 50 in all problems is 5.42 in Condition E-Sampling and 6.75 in Condition E-
Repeated).  Similarly, the best model in the E-sampling condition (Ensemble with an 
ENO of 25.92) has an ENO of 1.13 in Condition Description.  Again, this value is lower 
than for a model that predicts random choice (1.89 in Condition Description). 
 
6. Additional descriptive analyses  
6.1 Learning curves 
  Figures 2a and 2b present the observed R-rates in Condition E-repeated in 5 
blocks of 20 trials.  The learning curves documented in the 60 problems in each study 
were plotted in 12 graphs.  The classification of the problems to the 12 graphs was based 
on two properties: the probability of high payoff (Ph) and the relative value of the risky 
prospect. The most common pattern is a decrease in risky choices with experience.  This   26 
pattern is predicted by the hot stove effect (Denrell & March, 2001).  Comparison of the 
three rows suggests an interesting nonlinear relationship between the probability of high 
payoff (Ph) and the magnitude of the hot stove effect.  A decrease in R rate with 
experience is clearer for high Ph and low Ph, but not for medium Ph level.  This 
nonlinear relationship explains why previous studies that focus on gambles with equally 
likely outcomes (like Biele, Erev & Ert, 2009) found no evidence for the hot stove effect.  
The learning curves in the medium Ph problem show higher sensitivity to the expected 
values.  This pattern can be a product of the joint effect of underweighting of rare events 
and the hot stove effect. 
< Insert Figure 2> 
 
7. Discussion 
  The current project was motivated by the hope that a careful study of quantitative 
predictions could contribute to behavioral decision research by facilitating theoretical 
insights and clarifying the models and the boundaries of the different phenomena.  In 
addition, we suggested that the organization of prediction competitions can facilitate the 
study of quantitative models.  We can re-evaluate these potential contributions in light of 
the findings and experience described above.  
 
7.1 On predictions and explanations 
The current results shed some light on the ways in which quantitative models can 
facilitate the development of theoretical explanations of choice behavior.  One example is 
the success of the ACT-R model (and the similar baseline explorative sampler model) in 
condition E-Repeated.  This success suggests that the processes that underlie repeated 
decisions are likely to be close to the processes that underlie retrieval from memory.   
A more developed example involves the explanation of gaming (the decision to 
buy lotteries and play Casino games).  The most popular explanation of gaming involves 
the assertion that rare events are overweighted (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).   The 
current analysis highlights an important shortcoming of this explanation, and suggests an 
alternative.  The shortcoming is revealed by the observation of underweighting of rare   27 
events in decisions from experience.  Since people game even when they base decisions 
on experience, the overweighting explanation seems insufficient.   
Another interesting shortcoming of the common explanations of gaming involves 
the observation that most people do not game frequently.  For example, in a survey 
conducted in New Zealand, Amey (2001) found that 87% of the 1500 respondents exhibit 
this behavior at least once in the last 12 months, but only 10% of the respondents game 
more than 6 times at that period.
11 The alternative explanation suggested by the current 
analysis involves the possibility that gaming, by non-professionals, is a reflection of the 
stochastic nature of choice behavior.  It is possible that like the decisions analyzed here, 
the decisions to game are best described by a stochastic model.  The fact that people 
game, under this account, is not the product of a consistent bias.  Rather, it is a product of 
the fact that people are inconsistent: Most people choose to avoid gaming in most cases, 
but noisy processes lead them to game in some rare cases.  The leading models presented 
above suggest that this inconsistency can result from the tendency to rely on small 
samples from experience.   
 
7.2 The 1-800 critique  
  Recall the 1-800 critique from the introduction. Under that critique, leading 
models of choice behavior do not apply in the same way in all situations, and therefore a 
toll-free help line may be needed to assist users who wish to apply such models.  The 
prediction competition procedure remedies the problem identified by the 1-800 critique.  
The competition required the development of models that produce quantitative 
predictions in a well-defined space of situations. We did not have to call the participants 
to derive the predictions of their models.  The success of the submitted models (their high 
ENO) suggests that the 1-800 problem is not a reflection of a deep shortcoming of 
behavioral decision research.  The knowledge accumulated in behavioral decision 
research can be used to derive clear and very useful predictions of behavior.  Moreover, 
the large advantage of the best models over intuition implies that exams in behavioral 
decision research need not always be dissimilar to exams in the exact sciences.      
 
                                                 
11 We thank Robin Hogarth for this example.   28 
7.3 The boundaries of the different regularities 
  The experimental part of the current project clarifies the boundaries of the 
tendencies to overweight and underweight rare events.  Even on randomly chosen 
problems, when the risky prospects involve rare outcomes (probability below 0.2), the 
results reveal significant negative correlation between the proportions of risky choices in 
decisions from description and decisions from experience.  The observed deviations from 
maximization suggest that the participants behave as if they overweight these rare events 
in decisions from description, and underweight rare events in decisions from experience.  
This pattern replicates previous findings (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 
2004). The main contribution of the current replication is the demonstration of the 
generality of this gap: It is not limited to the particular problems used in the initial 
demonstrations, but reliably emerges in experiments that study 120 randomly selected 
choice problems.    
  The high ENO of the stochastic version of cumulative prospect theory (SCPT) in 
the description condition, but not in the two experience conditions, also underlines the 
difference between decisions from description and from experience. It highlights the 
limitations of trying to build general theories of decision making by focusing only on 
decision making in environments in which clear counterexamples to the predictions of 
expected utility theory can be constructed. The competition results suggest that the 
differences between decisions from description and from experience may be differences 
in kind, more than just differences in parameters. This point of view gains some support 
from the observation that no participant in the competition chose to use parametric 
variations of a single model in the different settings. 
So we are claiming not just that SCPT does not win in the experience conditions, 
but that it does not do very well.  Similarly for the other models; our conclusions would 
be quite different if some model was a close second choice for every condition, for 
example. But that was not the case; the models that predicted well for decisions from 
description predicted poorly for decisions from experience, and vice versa. 
  
7.4 Partial effectiveness and future research   29 
The choice prediction competition attempted to achieve two related goals.  The 
first was to facilitate the development of clear and useful quantitative models of choice 
behavior.  We believe this goal was only partly achieved.  First, only in one of the three 
competitions did the winning model outperform the best baseline model.  A pessimistic 
interpretation is that the competition procedure is not a very effective way to produce 
useful models.  We favor, however, a more optimistic interpretation: The best baselines 
were minimal modifications of models that were found to have high ENO in previous 
research on similar problems.  The submitted models, on the other hand, reflected more 
creative generalizations.  The success of the baseline models suggests that the knowledge 
accumulated in previous studies of quantitative models is very useful.   It seems likely 
that the creative approach taken by the participants (and by other researchers) will 
eventually lead to the development of more accurate predictions that will outperform the 
baseline models in all three conditions.  And the development of simpler, more principled 
models will enable to their integration in increasingly broader task contexts. 
A more problematic observation involves the complexity of the submitted models.  
The competition’s requirement to submit a model (in terms of a computer program) that 
enables unambiguous predictions and its emphasis on predictive accuracy came at the 
expense of other desirable modeling properties such as simplicity. For example, the 
ensemble model that won the E-sampling competition includes four sub-models and 
encompasses numerous parameters. Clearly, the model is not easy to handle. However, its 
predictive success suggests that its key psychological motivation, namely the observation 
that in making choices different people recruit different psychological processes, is 
important.  Future research could use this insight to develop a simpler version of the 
ensemble model while retaining its high ENO. In brief, the choice competition as 
implemented here is not a magical method that stimulates the discovery of simple 
models. Nevertheless, it is a powerful tool that spurs the development of benchmark 
models, which tell us how good or bad our established models are. Moreover, the 
psychological gist of the benchmark models can then be used to develop better 
descriptive models or to improve on the existing ones.  In addition, future research that 
will broaden the competition to increasingly wider sets of task conditions might have the   30 
effect of favoring simpler, more general models over those optimized and engineered to 
relatively narrow task conditions. 
  The second goal of the competition was to clarify the meaning of the term 
"predictions."  Many studies use the same word to refer to fitted values.  Moreover, 
papers that try to distinguish between fitted values and predictions are subject to a 
selection bias.  That is, researchers are more likely to complete papers if the results are 
clear to them, and subjective clarity is correlated with the success of the researchers’ 
favorite model.  Thus, potential readers of papers that focus on quantitative predictions 
often treat them with distrust and/or ignore them. We believe that the choice prediction 
competition procedure has addressed these important problems.  It provides a clear 
definition of the term “prediction,” and implies mechanism to minimize selection biases 
and enhance trust.     
 
7.5 Summary 
The current project addresses a decision problem faced by behavioral decision 
scientists: the decision between "a focus on counterexamples" or "a focus on quantitative 
models."  This decision is made from experience.  The decision makers (scientists) do not 
receive a description of the incentive structure.  They have to rely on their personal 
experience, and on the experience of other scientists.  Our analysis suggests that a focus 
on counterexamples is likely to lead to better outcomes most of the time.  The evaluation 
of quantitative predictions tends to be more expensive and less interesting than the 
evaluation of counterexamples.   Nevertheless, it is not clear that the "focus on 
counterexamples" choice always maximizes expected return. There are reasons to believe 
that in certain (perhaps rare) cases a focus on quantitative models can lead to extremely 
important results.  Some of the most important breakthroughs in science were based on 
prior development of useful quantitative models of the relevant phenomena.  We believe 
that behavioral decision scientists tend to underweight these rare cases, and hope that the 
current project clarifies the value of quantitative predictions and will help change this 
situation. 
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Appendix 1: The problem selection algorithm. 
The 60 problems in each set are determined according to the following algorithm: 
•  The probability p is drawn (with equal probability) from one of the following sets 
(.01-.09), (.1-.9), (.91-.99) . (Each interval is chosen with probability 1/3, and points 
within the interval are then chosen with equal probability from a grid with interval .01. 
•  Two random draws are generated for the risky option (Xmax, Xmin): 
•  Xmin is drawn (with equal probability) from (-10, 0);  Xmax is drawn from (0, 
+10). 
•  H'= Round(Xmax, .1)
12 
•  L'= Round(Xmin, .1) 
•  The Expected Value of the risky option is determined and an error term is added 
to create the value of the safe option: 
•  m = Round(H'*p+L'*(1-p), .1); 
•  sd = min(abs(m-L')/2,abs(m-H')/2,2);  e=rannor(0)*sd;  m=m+e;  Notice that the 
addition of e creates some problens with a dominant strategy (see Problem 1 in Table 1a). 
•  Finally, the dataset is balanced to include equal proportions of problems that 
include nonpositive payoffs (loss domain), nonnegative payoffs (gain domain) and both 
positive and negative payoffs (mixed domain), by adding a constant (con) to H and L and 
M.  
•  If problem <21 then con = -max+min; 
•  If 20 < problem < 41 then con = 0; 
•  If problem > 40 then con = +max-min; 
•  L = L'+con; M = round(m+con,.1); H = H'+con;  
 
                                                 
12 The function Round(x, .1) rounds x to the nearest decimal. The function abs(x) returns the absolute value  of x. the 
function rannor(0) returns a randomly selected value from a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and standard 
deviation of 1. 
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Appendix 2: Translation of the instructions and typical experimental screens of each of 
the three conditions (Description, Experience-Sampling, and Experience-Repeated). 
 
Condition Description: 
This experiment includes several games. In each game you will be asked to select one of 
two alternatives.   
At the end of the experiment one of the games will be randomly drawn (all the 
games are equally likely to be drawn), and the alternative selected in this game will be 
realized.    
Your payoff for the experiment will be the outcome (in Sheqels) of this game. 
Good luck! 
 
Experimental Screen after selecting the safer option in Problem 32: 
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Condition E-Sampling: 
This experiment includes several games.  Each game includes two stages: The sampling 
stage and the choice stage. 
At the choice stage (the second stage) you will be asked to select once between 
two virtual decks cards (two buttons).  Your choice will lead to a random draw of one 
card from this deck, and the number written on the card will be the "game's outcome."  
During the sampling stage (the first stage) you will be able to sample the two decks.  
When you feel that you have sampled enough press the "choice stage" key to move to the 
choice stage. 
At the end of the experiment one of the games will be randomly drawn (all the 
games are equally likely to be drawn). Your payoff for the experiment will be the 
outcome (in Sheqels) of this game.  
Good luck! 
 
Experimental screen (a) after sampling the deck associated with the safer option in 
Problem 4 during the sampling stage: 
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Experimental screen (b) – After choosing the deck associated with the safer option in 
Problem 4 during the real game stage: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   35 
Condition E-Repeated: 
This experiment includes several games.  Each game includes several trials.  You will 
receive a message before the beginning of each game. 
In each trial you will be asked to select one of two buttons.  Each press will result 
in a payoff that will be presented on the selected button. 
At the end of the experiment one of the trials will be randomly drawn (all the 
trials are equally likely to be drawn). Your payoff for the experiment will be the outcome 
(in Sheqels) of this trial. 
Good luck! 
 
Experimental Screen after choosing the risky alternative in Problem 36:   36 
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 Table 1a: The 60 estimation set problems and the aggregate proportion of choices in risk 
in each of the experimental conditions.   42 
   Risky   Safe  Proportion of Risky Choices (R - rate)  Average Number of 
Problem  H  Ph  L  M  Description  E-Sampling  E-Repeated  Samples per Problem 
1*  -0.3  0.96  -2.1  -0.3  0.20  0.25  0.33  10.35 
2  -0.9  0.95  -4.2  -1.0  0.20  0.55  0.50  9.70 
3  -6.3  0.30  -15.2  -12.2  0.60  0.50  0.24  13.85 
4  -10.0  0.20  -29.2  -25.6  0.85  0.30  0.32  10.70 
5  -1.7  0.90  -3.9  -1.9  0.30  0.80  0.45  9.85 
6  -6.3  0.99  -15.7  -6.4  0.35  0.75  0.68  9.85 
7  -5.6  0.70  -20.2  -11.7  0.50  0.60  0.37  11.10 
8  -0.7  0.10  -6.5  -6.0  0.75  0.20  0.27  13.90 
9  -5.7  0.95  -16.3  -6.1  0.30  0.60  0.43  10.95 
10  -1.5  0.92  -6.4  -1.8  0.15  0.90  0.44  11.75 
11  -1.2  0.02  -12.3  -12.1  0.90  0.15  0.26  11.90 
12  -5.4  0.94  -16.8  -6.4  0.10  0.65  0.55  11.15 
13  -2.0  0.05  -10.4  -9.4  0.50  0.20  0.11  10.35 
14  -8.8  0.60  -19.5  -15.5  0.70  0.80  0.66  12.10 
15  -8.9  0.08  -26.3  -25.4  0.60  0.30  0.19  11.60 
16  -7.1  0.07  -19.6  -18.7  0.55  0.25  0.34  11.00 
17  -9.7  0.10  -24.7  -23.8  0.90  0.55  0.37  15.10 
18  -4.0  0.20  -9.3  -8.1  0.65  0.40  0.34  11.15 
19  -6.5  0.90  -17.5  -8.4  0.55  0.80  0.49  14.90 
20  -4.3  0.60  -16.1  -4.5  0.05  0.20  0.08  10.85 
21  2.0  0.10  -5.7  -4.6  0.65  0.20  0.11  8.75 
22  9.6  0.91  -6.4  8.7  0.05  0.70  0.41  9.15 
23  7.3  0.80  -3.6  5.6  0.15  0.70  0.39  10.70 
24  9.2  0.05  -9.5  -7.5  0.50  0.05  0.08  14.60 
25  7.4  0.02  -6.6  -6.4  0.90  0.10  0.19  8.90 
26  6.4  0.05  -5.3  -4.9  0.65  0.15  0.20  13.35 
27  1.6  0.93  -8.3  1.2  0.15  0.70  0.50  8.90 
28  5.9  0.80  -0.8  4.6  0.35  0.65  0.58  10.60 
29  7.9  0.92  -2.3  7.0  0.40  0.65  0.51  10.60 
30  3.0  0.91  -7.7  1.4  0.40  0.70  0.41  9.95 
31  6.7  0.95  -1.8  6.4  0.10  0.70  0.52  11.00 
32  6.7  0.93  -5.0  5.6  0.25  0.55  0.49  10.95 
33  7.3  0.96  -8.5  6.8  0.15  0.75  0.65  11.10 
34  1.3  0.05  -4.3  -4.1  0.75  0.10  0.30  11.35 
35  3.0  0.93  -7.2  2.2  0.25  0.55  0.44  12.80 
36  5.0  0.08  -9.1  -7.9  0.40  0.2  0.09  14.60 
37  2.1  0.80  -8.4  1.3  0.10  0.35  0.28  10.90   43 
38  6.7  0.07  -6.2  -5.1  0.65  0.20  0.29  10.90 
39  7.4  0.30  -8.2  -6.9  0.85  0.70  0.58  12.65 
40  6.0  0.98  -1.3  5.9  0.10  0.70  0.61  13.50 
41  18.8  0.80  7.6  15.5  0.35  0.60  0.52  9.00 
42  17.9  0.92  7.2  17.1  0.15  0.80  0.48  10.80 
43*  22.9  0.06  9.6  9.2  0.75  0.90  0.88  9.90 
44  10.0  0.96  1.7  9.9  0.20  0.70  0.56  10.05 
45  2.8  0.80  1.0  2.2  0.55  0.70  0.48  19.40 
46  17.1  0.10  6.9  8.0  0.45  0.20  0.32  9.15 
47  24.3  0.04  9.7  10.6  0.65  0.20  0.25  11.80 
48  18.2  0.98  6.9  18.1  0.10  0.75  0.59  9.00 
49  13.4  0.50  3.8  9.9  0.05  0.45  0.13  8.85 
50  5.8  0.04  2.7  2.8  0.70  0.20  0.35  9.95 
51  13.1  0.94  3.8  12.8  0.15  0.65  0.52  8.95 
52  3.5  0.09  0.1  0.5  0.35  0.25  0.26  11.85 
53  25.7  0.10  8.1  11.5  0.40  0.25  0.11  9.00 
54  16.5  0.01  6.9  7.0  0.85  0.25  0.18  13.40 
55  11.4  0.97  1.9  11.0  0.15  0.70  0.66  9.55 
56  26.5  0.94  8.3  25.2  0.20  0.50  0.53  14.25 
57  11.5  0.6  3.7  7.9  0.35  0.45  0.45  10.00 
58  20.8  0.99  8.9  20.7  0.25  0.65  0.63  12.90 
59  10.1  0.30  4.2  6.0  0.45  0.45  0.32  10.10 
60  8.0  0.92  0.8  7.7  0.20  0.55  0.44  10.20 
Note - All problems involve binary choice between a sure payoff (M) and a risky option 
with two possible outcomes (H with probability Ph, L otherwise). For example, Problem 
60 describes a choice between a gain of 7.7 Sheqels for sure, and a gamble that yields a 
gain of 8.0 Sheqels with probability of 0.92 and a gain of 0.8 Sheqels otherwise.  The 
proportions of choices are over all 20 participants, and (in Condition E-Repeated) over 
the 100 trials.  Problems with a dominant strategy (1 and 43) are marked with a star. 
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Table 1b: The 60 competition problems and the aggregated risky choices per problem.  
   Risk   Safe  Proportion of Risky Choices (R - rate)  Average Number of 
Problem  H  Ph  L  M  Description  E-Sampling  E-Repeated  Samples per Problem 
1  -8.7  0.06  -22.8  -21.4  0.70  0.45  0.25  16.35 
2  -2.2  0.09  -9.6  -8.7  0.60  0.15  0.27  15.65 
3  -2.0  0.10  -11.2  -9.5  0.45  0.10  0.25  15.60 
4  -1.4  0.02  -9.1  -9.0  0.85  0.20  0.33  15.90 
5  -0.9  0.07  -4.8  -4.7  0.80  0.35  0.37  15.55 
6  -4.7  0.91  -18.1  -6.8  0.50  0.75  0.63  14.75 
7  -9.7  0.06  -24.8  -24.2  0.95  0.50  0.30  20.95 
8  -5.7  0.96  -20.6  -6.4  0.35  0.65  0.66  15.85 
9  -5.6  0.10  -19.4  -18.1  0.75  0.20  0.31  15.50 
10  -2.5  0.60  -5.5  -3.6  0.45  0.50  0.34  17.15 
11  -5.8  0.97  -16.4  -6.6  0.40  0.65  0.61  17.35 
12  -7.2  0.05  -16.1  -15.6  0.75  0.40  0.25  16.85 
13  -1.8  0.93  -6.7  -2.0  0.25  0.55  0.44  11.85 
14  -6.4  0.20  -22.4  -18.0  0.70  0.15  0.21  12.05 
15*  -3.3  0.97  -10.5  -3.2  0.10  0.10  0.16  18.20 
16  -9.5  0.10  -24.5  -23.5  0.90  0.70  0.39  15.70 
17  -2.2  0.92  -11.5  -3.4  0.25  0.65  0.47  14.70 
18  -1.4  0.93  -4.7  -1.7  0.30  0.55  0.41  16.50 
19  -8.6  0.10  -26.5  -26.3  0.90  0.60  0.49  16.25 
20  -6.9  0.06  -20.5  -20.3  1.00  0.60  0.25  15.95 
21  1.8  0.60  -4.1  1.7  0.05  0.10  0.08  10.80 
22*  9.0  0.97  -6.7  9.1  0.00  0.15  0.14  14.85 
23  5.5  0.06  -3.4  -2.6  0.40  0.20  0.28  18.05 
24  1.0  0.93  -7.1  0.6  0.25  0.65  0.46  14.05 
25  3.0  0.20  -1.3  -0.1  0.35  0.25  0.21  14.50 
26  8.9  0.10  -1.4  -0.9  0.70  0.25  0.23  17.65 
27  9.4  0.95  -6.3  8.5  0.20  0.55  0.67  13.25 
28  3.3  0.91  -3.5  2.7  0.25  0.65  0.58  12.95 
29  5.0  0.40  -6.9  -3.8  0.75  0.70  0.39  15.10 
30  2.1  0.06  -9.4  -8.4  0.50  0.30  0.33  18.10 
31*  0.9  0.20  -5.0  -5.3  1.00  0.95  0.88  14.80 
32  9.9  0.05  -8.7  -7.6  0.65  0.30  0.21  19.70 
33  7.7  0.02  -3.1  -3  0.90  0.35  0.28  15.95 
34  2.5  0.96  -2.0  2.3  0.20  0.50  0.52  15.85 
35  9.2  0.91  -0.7  8.2  0.15  0.60  0.56  14.70 
36*  2.9  0.98  -9.4  2.9  0.00  0.35  0.34  18.15 
37  2.9  0.05  -6.5  -5.7  0.60  0.35  0.30  15.30 
38  7.8  0.99  -9.3  7.6  0.20  0.75  0.62  15.25 
39  6.5  0.80  -4.8  6.2  0.00  0.35  0.32  11.00 
40  5.0  0.90  -3.8  4.1  0.10  0.50  0.46  13.40 
41  20.1  0.95  6.5  19.6  0.15  0.65  0.50  13.70 
42  5.2  0.50  1.4  5.1  0.05  0.05  0.08  12.00 
43  12.0  0.50  2.4  9.0  0.00  0.25  0.17  14.35 
44  20.7  0.90  9.1  19.8  0.15  0.55  0.44  11.85   45 
45  8.4  0.07  1.2  1.6  0.90  0.25  0.20  14.80 
46  22.6  0.40  7.2  12.4  0.75  0.30  0.41  15.30 
47  23.4  0.93  7.6  22.1  0.35  0.65  0.72  13.20 
48  17.2  0.09  5.0  5.9  0.85  0.50  0.24  14.00 
49  18.9  0.90  6.7  17.7  0.15  0.45  0.57  11.60 
50  12.8  0.04  4.7  4.9  0.65  0.30  0.26  15.45 
51  19.1  0.03  4.8  5.2  0.70  0.25  0.22  18.75 
52  12.3  0.91  1.3  12.1  0.10  0.35  0.41  10.50 
53  6.8  0.90  3.0  6.7  0.20  0.40  0.41  11.60 
54  22.6  0.30  9.2  11.0  0.85  0.85  0.60  10.55 
55  6.4  0.09  0.5  1.5  0.35  0.40  0.28  10.55 
56  15.3  0.06  5.9  7.1  0.40  0.25  0.17  17.75 
57  5.3  0.90  1.5  4.7  0.30  0.65  0.66  15.60 
58  21.9  0.50  8.1  12.6  0.85  0.80  0.47  11.35 
59  27.5  0.70  9.2  21.9  0.35  0.25  0.42  15.40 
60  4.4  0.20  0.7  1.1  0.75  0.70  0.38  12.60 
 
Problems with a dominant strategy (15, 22, 31 and 36) are marked with a star.   46 
 Table 2: The correlations between the R-rates (proportion of risky choices) in the 
different conditions using problem as a unit of analysis over the problems without 
dominant strategies in the estimation study (p-values in parentheses).   
 
 
 
    Estimation set  Competition set 
    E-sampling  E-repeated  E- Sampling  E- Repeated 
Description  -.53 
(<.001) 
-.37 
(.004) 
.04 
(.782) 
-.24 
(.081) 
Problems without dominant 
choices 
E-sampling    .83 
(<.001) 
  .76 
(<.001) 
Description  -74 
(<.001) 
-66 
(<.001) 
-.33 
(.030) 
-.60 
(< .001) 
Problems with rare events 
(ph <.2 or ph >.8) 
E-sampling    .84 
(<.001) 
  .76 
(<.001) 
Description  .30 
(.271) 
.51 
(.051) 
.72 
(.006) 
.74 
(.004) 
Problems without rare 
events (.2 ≤ ph ≤ .8) 
E-sampling    .84 
(<.001) 
  .83 
(<.001)   47 
Table 3:  Summary of the fit and prediction scores of the top three submitted models, and 
the most interesting baseline models in each competition. Pagree is the proportion of 
agreement between modal prediction and the modal choice, r is the Pearson correlation, 
MSD is mean squared deviation, ENO is the equivalent number of observations. 
 
3a: Condition Description: 
    Fitness Scores based on the 
Estimation Set (S
2=.1860) 
Prediction Scores based on the     
Competition Set (S
2=.1636) 
Title  Team and idea  Parameters  Pagree  r  MSD  Pagree  r  MSD  ENO 
Interesting 
Baselines  CPT 
α=.7, β=1, λ=1, 
γ=δ=.65  95%  0.85  0.0930  93%  0.86  0.0837  2.16 
  Priority  s=0.1  91%  0.76  0.1158  81%  0.65  0.1437  1.21 
Best 
Baseline 
SCPT with 
Normalization 
α=.89,β=.98, 
λ=1.5,µ=2.15 
γ=δ=.7  
89%  0.92  0.0116  95%  0.95  0.0102  80.99 
Winner  Haruvy:  
Logistic Regression 
β0=1,β1=.01, 
β2=.07,β3=.41, 
γ1=1.42,γ2=.32 
, γ3=-.621 
88%  0.92  0.0099  90%  0.94  0.0126  56.36 
Runner up  Yechiam:  
Version of SCPT 
with no Diminishing 
Sensitivity 
 
w=.46, υ=.05, 
λ1=.61,λ2=.73, 
θ=1.14, ε=.76, 
Δ=.15, τ,=.8 α=.-
10 
92%  0.89  0.0141  91%  0.93  0.0133  31.95 
Second 
Runner up 
Ann & Picard: 
CPT with Aspiration 
Levels 
β0=18.58,α=.61 
β=.52 λ=1 
wp=.99,wn=.99 
γ=.25, γ1=.30 
τ=.90 
  
87%  0.93  0.0088  90%  0.92  0.0165  19.66 
Intuition  Harvard students          83%  0.86  0.1149  1.88 
 
 
 
    Fitness scores based on the  
estimation set (S
2=.2023) 
 
Prediction scores based on the       
competition set (S
2 =.2111) 
 
Title  Team and Idea  Parameters  Pagree  r  MSD  Pagree  r  MSD  ENO 
Interesting 
Baseline 
Primed 
Sampler 
k = 5  90%  0.81  0.0270  82%  0.79  0.0251  14.51 
Best 
Baseline 
Primed 
Sampler with 
Variability 
k = 9  95%  0.88  0.0170  82%  0.80  0.0244  15.23 
Winner  Herzog, Hau, 
Hertwig: Linear 
combination 
α=1.19,β=1.35  
γ=1.42,δ=1.54 
λ=1.19; µ=.41, 
σ =.037, To= 
.0001,Tp=0.11,porder1 
=.38,  k = 9, and  N*  
95%  0.92  0.0099  83%  0.80  0.0187  25.92 
 
Runner Up  Ann, Picard: 
Sample by CPT 
and Aspiration 
Levels 
x=2.07,y=1.31 
z=0.71,v=7.53 
r=12.64,m=0.02 
 
92%  0.90  0.0115  82%  0.82  0.0203  21.66 
Second 
Runner Up 
Hau, Hertwig: 
Natural Mean 
N*  95%  0.89  0.01548  82%  0.79  0.0250  14.61 
   48 
3b: Condition E-Sampling.  
*N is a vector with 20 elements that determines the probability of the different sample sizes.  It was 
estimated by the number of samples taken by participants in the estimation set.  
 
3c: Condition E-Repeated:  
 
    Fitness scores based on the 
estimation set(S
2 = .0875) 
Prediction scores based on the    
competition set (S
2 = .0928) 
Title  Team and Idea  Parameters  Pagree  r  MSD  Pagree  r  MSD  ENO 
Interesting 
Baselines 
Normalized 
Reinforcement Learning 
w=.15, 
λ=1.1  76%  0.83  0.0092  84%  0.84  0.0087  22.89 
  Basic Reinforcement 
Learning 
w=.15, 
λ=1  56%  0.67  0.0224  66%  0.51  0.0263    4.28 
Best 
Baseline 
Explorative Sampler with 
Recency 
β=.10,  
w=.3, 
ε=.12, k=8 
 
82%  0.88  0.0075  86%  0.89  0.0066  47.22 
Winner  Stewart, West, & Lebiere: 
ACT – R with Sequential 
Dependencies and 
Blending Memory 
s = .35,   
τ= -1.6 
77%  0.88  0.0094  87%  0.89  0.0075  32.50 
Runner Up  Hochman & Ayal: 
Two-Stage Sampler 
w=1, 
δ=.55;β=.1
, f=.3;κ=6; 
ε=.11, 
r=.01; 
80%  0.90  0.0065  83%  0.87  0.0084  24.71 
Second 
Runner Up 
Haruvy: 
NRL with Inertia 
w=.14, 
λ=1.05 
q=0.32 
,i=0.5; 
75%  0.86  0.0080  86%  0.85  0.0084  24.71 
   49 
Figure 1: R-rate (proportion of risky choices) as a function of Ph (the probability of 
getting the high outcome from the risky gamble) in each of the three experimental 
conditions. 
 
1a: Estimation Study 
 
 
1b: Competition Study 
 
 
 
 
 
   50 
Figure 2: observed R-rates (proportion of risky choices) in Condition E-repeated in 5 
blocks of 20 trials.  The 60 problems were classified to 15 graphs according to (a) The 
probability of high payoff (Ph) and the relative expected value of the risky prospect (EVr-
EVs). 
2a: Estimation Study 
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2b: Competition Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE – The numbers in the legends are the problem id. In the tagged problems (e.g., 15 
and 22 in the lower left cell of Figure 2a) one alternative dominates the other. 
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